The Imperialist and Scientistic Pretensions…or The Secret and Not-So-Secret Sins, of Economics
In his Salon review of Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century
(Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), Thomas Frank writes:
“Academic
economics, especially in the United States, has for decades been gripped by a
kind of professional pretentiousness that is close to pathological. From time to
time its great minds have grown so impressed by their own didactic awesomeness
that they celebrate economics as ‘the imperial science’— ‘imperial’ not merely
because economics is the logic of globalization but because its math-driven
might is supposedly capable of defeating and colonizing every other branch of
the social sciences. Economists, the myth goes, make better historians, better
sociologists, better anthropologists than people who are actually trained in
those disciplines. One believable but possibly apocryphal tale I heard as a
graduate student in the ’90s was that economists at a prestigious Midwestern
university had actually taken to wearing white lab coats—because they supposedly
were the real scientific deal, unlike their colleagues in all those soft
disciplines.
Piketty
blasts it all to hell. His fellow economists may have mastered the art of
spinning abstract mathematical fantasies, he acknowledges, but they have
forgotten that measuring the real world comes first. In the book’s Introduction
this man who is now the most famous economist in the world accuses his
professional colleagues of a ‘childish passion for mathematics and for purely
theoretical and often highly ideological speculation’; he laughs at ‘their
absurd claim to greater scientific legitimacy, despite the fact that they know
almost nothing about anything.’ In a shocking reversal, he calls on the imperial
legions of economic pseudo-science to lay down their arms, to ‘avail ourselves
of the methods of historians, sociologists, and political scientists’; the
six-hundred-page book that follows, Piketty declares, is to be ‘as much a work
of history as of economics.’”
I’d like to point out to those (understandably) not familiar with, let alone failing to have kept abreast of, the academic economics literature* of, say, the last three decades or so, that this critique of the profession by Piketty is hardly new. In fact, it’s been made with eloquence, passion, and persistence—and in some circles at least, with devastating effect—by Deirdre (formerly Donald) McCloskey (who is not at all of Leftist suasion), beginning with The Rhetoric of Economics (University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), continuing through Knowledge and Persuasion in Economics (Cambridge University Press, 1994), and again, in a little gem (58 pgs.!), The Secret Sins of Economics (Prickly Paradigm Press, 2002). Much of what Piketty is saying here sounds virtually word-for-word what she has been saying for several decades now. In the latter book, for instance, she laments the appalling extent and degree of institutional and historical ignorance of her better-known colleagues in the profession, as well as their corresponding “cultural barbarism,” dated and simplistic (because crudely positivist) conceptions of science, and “high school” ethics, in addition to otherworldly mathematical formalism.
I’d like to point out to those (understandably) not familiar with, let alone failing to have kept abreast of, the academic economics literature* of, say, the last three decades or so, that this critique of the profession by Piketty is hardly new. In fact, it’s been made with eloquence, passion, and persistence—and in some circles at least, with devastating effect—by Deirdre (formerly Donald) McCloskey (who is not at all of Leftist suasion), beginning with The Rhetoric of Economics (University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), continuing through Knowledge and Persuasion in Economics (Cambridge University Press, 1994), and again, in a little gem (58 pgs.!), The Secret Sins of Economics (Prickly Paradigm Press, 2002). Much of what Piketty is saying here sounds virtually word-for-word what she has been saying for several decades now. In the latter book, for instance, she laments the appalling extent and degree of institutional and historical ignorance of her better-known colleagues in the profession, as well as their corresponding “cultural barbarism,” dated and simplistic (because crudely positivist) conceptions of science, and “high school” ethics, in addition to otherworldly mathematical formalism.
McCloskey
has courageously and cleverly attempted to persuade her colleagues in economics
to rely far less on mathematical formalism and a “scientistic style,” and far
more on the “whole rhetorical tetrad—the facts, logics, metaphors, and stories
necessary” [….] that can render economics “more rational and more reasonable,”
not to mention accessible to a literate public. As she notes, “[i]t would of
course be idiotic to object to the mere existence of mathematics in economics,”
and indeed, mathematics in economics, used properly if not modestly, is a
“virtue,” but “[l]ike all virtues it can be carried too far…, becoming the
Devil’s work, sin.” Pure theory and econometrics, for instance, have too often
been purchased at the expense of old-fashioned empiricism and intelligent
inquiry into and observation of the real world (hence the need for journals like
Real World Economics Review). Worship
at the altar of qualitative theorems and statistical significance is
otherworldly, consciously or otherwise designed to have its practitioners don
the priestly mantle of “hard science” (as exemplified by physics). In
McCloskey’s words:
“It
is not difficult to explain to outsiders what is so dramatically, insanely,
sinfully wrong with the two leading methods in high-level economics, qualitative
theorems and statistical significance. It is very difficult to explain it to
insiders, because the insiders cannot believe that methods in which they have
been elaborately trained and which are used by people they admire most are
simply unscientific nonsense, having literally nothing to do with whatever
actual scientific contribution (and I repeat, it is considerable) that economics
makes to the understanding of society. So they simply can’t grasp arguments that
are plain to people not socialized in economics.”
Related
critiques have been made by others, including S.M. Amadae in Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice
Liberalism (University of Chicago Press, 2003), and in several articles and
books by Philip Mirowski. Two works by Christian Arnsperger, Critical Political Economy… (Routledge,
2008), and Full-Spectrum Economics:
Toward an inclusive and emancipatory
social science (Routledge, 2010), proffer a programmatic focus on
transforming the discipline from within and without, serving up a plethora of
provocative if not utopian possibilities for fundamentally altering the
character of the profession. I think it’s also useful to examine writings
suggestive of “political economy” in the broadest sense—like Gandhi’s—that are
clearly well outside the parameters of neoclassical economics: see, for example,
B.N. Ghosh’s Gandhian Political
Economy (Ashgate, 2007), and Beyond
Gandhian Economics: Towards a
Creative Deconstruction (Sage Publications, 2012).
*
And without implying I’ve come anywhere close to mastering same.
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