Isaiah Berlin’s Liberalism
Concise
appraisal of Isaiah Berlin’s thought by Gerald F. Gaus: “Thus, it seems that to
the extent Berlin is a pluralist [with regard to values], he is not a liberal;
and to the extent he is a liberal, he is not a pluralist.” This is the
conclusion reached after carefully and charitably analyzing Berlin’s argument
that an appreciation of the incommensurability of plural values rationally
entails liberalism. Berlin, however, appears to have eventually abandoned that
claim, as Gaus notes, coming simply to endorse “a pluralism limited by
rationally agreed-upon moral truth” [thereby placing him back firmly in the
Enlightenment, rather than the ‘post-Enlightenment’ tradition]. Finally, writes
Gaus, “to the extent his doctrine endorses liberalism, it is not his pluralism,
but his ‘rationalistic’ conviction that we can uncover common objective truths
[through an appeal to human nature], that does the philosophical work.” Please
see Gaus’s important book, Contemporary
Theories of Liberalism (Sage, 2003): 25-55.
For an
introduction to Berlin’s philosophical views, see this SEP entry by Joshua
Cherniss and Henry Hardy (one of the few entries, if I’m not mistaken, with a
photo!)
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